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Modelling demographic behaviours  
in the French microsimulation model Destinie: 
An analysis of future change in completed fertility 
Abstract 
Future change in partnerships and fertility are not easy to forecast. However, the fertility of the 
youngest cohorts will depend on those behaviours. The way young people start a partnership 
has changed a lot during the past three decades. Many couples are now unmarried, union 
disruptions and step-families are more frequent, young people leave school later and the age of 
motherhood has increased. Microsimulation can provide a measure of the change in future 
completed fertility, which helps to analyse the influence of current behaviours on future change 
in family structures. If behaviours remain the same as the ones observed from 1995 to 1996, 
completed fertility may decrease to less than 2 children per woman born around 1970 and 
remain constant about 1.9 children per woman for women born after 1975. This decrease stems 
from a postponement in the age of motherhood and an increase in union disruptions. Fertility at 
older ages as well as the desire to have at least one common biological child in step-family do 
not offset the negative effects of delaying births and living longer without a partner before the 
age of 45. Timing in unions and disruptions seems to play an important role in fertility. Women 
who live only a short time without a partner after a disruption experience have practically the 
same number of children as those who are still living with their first coresident partner.  
These simulations remain of course prospective and rely on several assumptions which may not 
prove adequate in the future. In particular, they assume that future behaviours will remain 
identical to the ones currently observed. Although estimated behaviours provide results 
consistent with available empirical work, it does not mean  that  some household behaviours will 
not change in the long-run. 
Keywords: microsimulation, demographic trends, fertility 
 
Modélisation des comportements démographiques  
dans Destinie 
Une analyse des évolutions futures de la descendance finale 
Résumé 
Formation des unions, ruptures, arrivée des enfants : autant de comportements dont l’évolution 
à long terme déterminera la descendance finale des jeunes générations d’aujourd’hui. La 
formation des familles a fortement évolué au cours des trente dernières années  : 
développement de la cohabitation hors mariage, ruptures et recompositions familiales plus 
fréquentes, allongement de la durée des études et recul de l’âge à la maternité. Prolonger par 
microsimulation les comportements observés actuellement est un exercice utile pour fournir des 
ordres de grandeurs sur l’évolution future des structures familiales. Si les nouvelles générations 
adoptent les mêmes comportements matrimoniaux et féconds que ceux observés en 1995 et 
1996, l’allongement progressif de la durée des études des jeunes nés avant 1975 
s’accompagnerait d’un recul de l’âge à la première maternité et d’une diminution du nombre 
d’enfants mis au monde par chaque femme au cours de sa vie. La descendance finale pourrait 
alors passer en dessous de 2  enfants par femme pour les générations nées dans les 
années 1970. Le décalage progressif de la fécondité vers des âges plus élevés et l’effet positif 
du désir d’enfants communs  dans les couples recomposés ne permettraient pas de compenser 
le retard pris sur les premières naissances et les effets globalement négatifs sur la fécondité de 
la plus forte fréquence des périodes passées sans conjoint.  
L’ampleur des évolutions simulées reste évidemment affectée d’incertitudes, du fait notamment 
des hypothèses de stabilité des comportements qui les sous-tendent. En particulier, les 
microsimulations se fondent sur les comportements observés en 1995 et 1996, années de 
fécondité relativement faible. Reproduire ces comportements au fil des années pourrait 
conduire à sous-estimer légèrement  la descendance finale des jeunes générations, si la 
récente reprise de la fécondité s’avérait durable. 
Mots-clés : microsimulation, comportements démographiques à long terme, fécondité 
Classification JEL : C15, J12, J13   3
Introduction 
Destinie is a dynamic microsimulation model developed at Insee to simulate changes 
in old-age pensions over the long run
1. Since the main purpose of the model is to 
analyse how the situation of retired people may evolve in the future, a particular 
attention had been devoted to the modelling of demographic events (births, deaths, 
union formations and disruptions). This is the part of the model this paper will focus 
on.  
Destinie operates at the individual level: each year, the data base is altered by 
demographic events. Since the previous version of the model, the estimation of 
demographic behaviours has been improved and relies on new available surveys. In 
the first version of the model, the start and termination of de facto unions, with or 
without marriage, were estimated from data on marriages and divorces only. As a 
result, many “ad-hoc” parameters were to be added to deal with unions without 
marriage (Insee, 1999). The aim was to improve those estimations by using surveys 
collecting data on all married and unmarried couples.  
Current demographic behaviours are now estimated in a quite simple way, and 
depend on the covariates that have the major influence on each behaviour. 
Probabilities to live a demographic event (start and termination of partnerships, births, 
deaths, migrations and leaving parental home) have been estimated by duration spent 
since the previous event, which is a significant source of demographic heterogeneity. 
For instance, the probability to form the first union depends on the number of years 
spent since the end of schooling, the probability to give birth to the first child depends 
on union duration.  
Despite our choice to focus only on few covariates, the modelling of demographic 
events in the new version of Destinie provides a roughly good description of current 
behaviours. Assumptions upon which the microsimulation rely are quite simple but 
accurate, which is important as outcomes strongly depend on them. As a result, 
Destinie may become a quite useful tool to study not only retirement issues but also 
demographic topics, such as future change in completed fertility.  
Section 1 presents the new modelling of demographic events that rely on transition 
probabilities. Section 2 describes the demographic behaviours generated by this 
modelling. Section 3 details the results of the microsimulation by 2030. A particular 
stress is put on the way such a microsimulation model could be useful for 
demographic analysis by focusing on the influence of current behaviours on the 
decrease in future completed fertility. 
                                                       
1 A first version of the model was developed by D. Blanchet and J.M. Chanut in 1995, then completed in the 
“Redistribution et politiques Sociales” division in 1997-1998 (Insee, 1999)   4  5
Section 1: The microsimulation of life course events 
The microsimulation model Destinie is based on individual data and projects future 
changes in population and families. Each year, demographic events are simulated: 
start and termination of partnerships, births and deaths. Section 1 focuses on the 
functioning of the model and presents how transition probabilities have been 
estimated. Results are detailed in Section 2. 
 
1. Modelling the changes in a sample of individuals from 1998 to 2030 
Destinie starts with a sample of individuals and the data base is modified by 
demographic events from 1998 to the target year of the simulation. In the paper, 
simulation is performed until 2030, but the model can run up to 2040. 
The initial sample is composed of about 50  000 individuals. These individuals are 
drawn from the 1998 Survey on Financial Assets
2 and partially duplicated in order to 
be representative of the total population in 1.1.1998 (according to sex, age, social 
position, household structure, location) (see Burricand, 1999 for more details on the 
construction of the initial sample). 
Each year from 1998, the model simulates events that happen in individual’s life 
(figure 1). The simulation begins with a computation of all the probabilities to live 
demographic events: deaths, start of partnerships, unions breakups, births and leaving 
parental home. Each year, a transition occurs for the individual if the value of the 
number randomly drawn from a uniform distribution is lower than his/her probability to 
live this event within the year. For unions, a list of the men and women who are to 
start a partnership within the year is inferred by current’s probabilities. A matching 
between these men and women is then performed to simulate the start of 
partnerships
3. Leaving parental home is simulated separately for people who start a 
union within the year (who are assumed to leave parental home if they are still living 
with their parents) and for others (who have annual probabilities to leave parental 
home, for other reasons than starting a partnership). Migrations are also simulated to 
reflect an annual balance of about 50 000
4 people entering the country (30 000 adults 
and 20 000 children). 
The link between demographic events has been changed in comparison with the 
previous version (Insee, 1999), in order to improve the way simultaneous events are 
computed. From now on, it is possible to have a child at the beginning of a union, but 
it is not possible to have one during the year of a union disruption. Women and men 
who have just left their partner can live with another partner within the year of the 
disruption, but new unions can’t break-up within the year of starting the partnership.  
                                                       
2 The sample is based on people interviewed in this survey, because data from this survey have to be 
introduced in Destinie to study retirement issues. The present paper focuses on the demographic part of 
the model only.  
3 Each woman who is to start a partnership choices one men over 7 men who are likely to live with a 
partner, who are selected by random. The one who minimises age and social differences within the 
couple becomes her partner. More precisely, the one who minimises (man’s age - woman’s age-
3)²+(man’s age at the end of schooling - woman’s age at the end of schooling)² becomes the partner. The 
process ends when no man or woman is available (Insee, 1999). 
4 This level is the one projected in Insee Global Population (central assumptions) (C. Brutel 2001)    6
Figure 1: How demographic events are computed in Destinie ? 
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2. The estimation of annual risks for demographic events  
The start and termination of unions, births and deaths are simulated using estimated 
annual risks to live events. The age at leaving school, which is a major covariate in 
Destinie, is the only economic covariate taken into account to model demographic 
transition probabilities. The age at leaving school is modelled in an exogenous way. 
 
2.1. The age at leaving school: a major exogenous covariate  
The age at the end of schooling represents both social changes between generations 
and social position differences within a generation. In the model, the mean age at 
leaving school is increasing, following past observed trends. For people born after 
1975, its mean value is assumed to remain roughly constant around 21 (figure 2). This 
assumption is consistent with the fact that the schooling expectancy has remained 
stable since the late 90’s.    7
Figure 2: The evolution of the mean age at leaving school in the simulation 
(by year of birth) 
 
Estimation based on Insee Job Surveys  
Source: Insee, microsimulation model Destinie 
 
For people who have not achieved their studies in 1998, the first year of the 
simulation, and for children not yet born, the gap between the individual’s age at 
leaving school and the mean age at leaving school of his/her cohort is modelled as a 
function of the gap observed for his/her parents, allowing some type of social 
replication
5.  
The age at leaving school represents mostly an absolute age-effect when simulating 
the start of the first partnership and the birth of the first child and a relative social-
effect when simulating deaths. This covariate allows different timings in births and 
unions for the most graduated and the less graduated people.  
 
2.2. Estimating annual risks of unions and births, by duration since a previous 
event 
a) The data 
The data used to estimate demographic events are drawn from the French 1997 
Survey about Young People and Job Histories launched by Insee. A total of 10 900 
women and 9  900 men aged 19 to 45 (i.e. born between 1952 and 1978) were 
interviewed on their life and job histories. Information about the years of the start and 
termination of partnerships and births of children were collected. They are used to 
estimate annual risks to live demographic events observed in 1995 and 1996. 
Years before 1995 were not used to estimate current behaviours, as fertility was quite 
particular. In fact, the number of births during 1993 and 1994 was the lowest 
registered over the last 50 years (Beaumel, Eneau, Kerjosse, 1999). Fertility in 1995-
                                                       
5 Age at the end of schooling = round (mean age at the end of schooling for people of this generation + 
0.45*(father’s age at leaving school - father’s generation mean age at leaving school) + 0.31*(mother’s 
age at leaving school - mother’s generation mean age at leaving school) +2.67*(random number drawn 
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1996 reached roughly the mean level registered during the 90’s
: the total fertility rate 
(computed as the cumulated age-specific fertility rates registered during a year) was a 
little more than 1.7 children per woman. However, if fertility durably keeps on 
increasing as it did from 1998 to 2000, simulated events relying on 1995 and 1996 
birth behaviours might underestimate young women future completed fertility. Age-
specific fertility rates for each simulated year can be calculated from Destinie 
outcomes. The simulated total fertility rate at the beginning of the simulation is about 
1.75, which is a little lower than the one registered between 1998 to 2000, but it is 
regularly rising to reach 1.8 children per woman about the year 2005 and remains 
constant at a slightly higher level after the year 2015.  
 
b) The method 
For each event (start and termination of partnerships and births), annual risks 
represent the percentage of individuals who live the event within a year among those 
who have not yet lived it at the first of  January
6  (the so-called population at risk). 
Each transition is estimated by duration spent since the previous event
7. Those 
probabilities are estimated between 1995 and 1996 using logistic regressions (Table 1 
reviews covariates and parameters values).  
 
Start of the first partnership 
The risk to form the first union (life with the first coresident partner) is modelled 
separately for men and women. It depends on two covariates: the number of years 
elapsed since the end of schooling and the age at leaving school (before 21 / at 21 or 
after). It is assumed that nobody lives with a coresident partner before the year (s)he 
leaves school. The duration since the end of schooling is preferred to age, in order to 
replicate a postponement in union formation when the age at leaving school rises. A 
cross effect between the age at leaving school and the duration is introduced to take 
into account different union timings with the level of education
8. 
 
Union disruptions and start of other partnerships 
The risk for a union to get disrupted depends (negatively) on union duration. The 
probability to start another partnership depends (positively) on the number of years 
spent since the last disruption. Probabilities to start another partnership are estimated 
using only interviewed people living without a partner for less than 12 years and are 
applied for longer durations
9. This has no effect on results presented in Section 3, 
since it focuses on future change in the number of children per woman aged 45.  
 
                                                       
6 This method is valid only for events people can live only once. However, the sample size makes is 
necessary to put together second and later-order unions, and 5
th births and more, so that formations of 
second unions and births after the 5
th one can be lived more than once. Only a few events have been put 
together, so that the method is assumed to remain valid for all transitions. 
7 Note that all durations and ages in the paper are in number of years reached at the end of the year. 
8 The level of education is associated in the paper to the schooling age. The more graduated women are 
those who leave school at 21 or after. The less graduated women are those whose leave school before 
21.  
9 Since only people under 45 were interviewed, only few people were observed at long durations. For some 
events, parameters had to be estimated on relatively short durations, the estimated values being applied 
for longer durations.   9
Births 
The first birth
10 depends on union duration and  the mother’s age at leaving school, to 
allow differences in behaviours for more graduated people. Those two covariates are 
crossed to distinguish different timings in births according to the level of education.  
The probability to have another child depends on the number of children already born 
(size effect), the age of the youngest one (to reflect people’s wish to limit time spell 
between children) and the union histories. More precisely, a dummy is introduced to 
control whether the youngest child is born before the current union or not, in order to 
take into account a positive effect on fertility of the desire to have a shared biological 
child. It is important to integrate such a covariate in the microsimulation model, to 
soften the decrease in total fertility rate related to increasing union disruptions over 
time. Indeed, it is assumed that only women with a coresident partner can give birth to 
a child. Moreover, after staring a new partnership, simulated fertility would tend to be 
lower than in other unions, because the child born before the current union would 
have aged. The age at leaving school is not introduced to model second or later-order 
births, as available data doesn’t allow to find clear evidence of different annual 
probabilities between graduated women and others. No cross effects are introduced, 
as the sample size doesn’t allow it. It means thus that the influence of the youngest 
child’s age is assumed to be similar whatever the family size is and whatever the 
woman union history is. 
 
c) Period measures and microsimulation’s outcomes 
Annual risks to live demographic events have been estimated from events observed in 
1995-1996. Several indicators can be built from these annual probabilities, such as the  
percentage of people who will live an event over their lifetime or the duration above 
which half of the individuals have experienced the event (median duration). Both 
indicators  are not observed values, but represent what would happen to people who 
have, during their whole life, the behaviours observed the year of estimation (period 
measures, see calculation in appendix 1). They don’t take into account possible 
changes in behaviours. For instance, assuming that current young people have over 
their whole life the same probabilities as the ones observed in 1995-1996 means that, 
at long union durations, they will behave as old generations did
11. Moreover, such 
indicators don’t take into account events which may prevent people from living one of 
the events. For instance, the percentage of women who will have at least one child 
over their lifetime, inferred from the first birth probabilities by union duration, excludes 
possible union disruptions or woman deaths.  
Microsimulation results and demographic indicators directly computed from current 
probabilities are two different approaches of future trends. Destinie simulates what 
happens to a current population. People are assumed to follow current behaviours by 
duration, so that events they have not yet lived may be simulated. Only the youngest 
people in 1998 and babies born during the simulation will follow during all their live 
current behaviours. Results from microsimulation and those inferred directly by current 
annual probabilities by duration may thus be different for two reasons. Firstly, people 
may have lived events before the beginning of the simulation. Secondly, during the 
simulation, some events may occur and prevent other events to happen, which is not 
taken into account in period indicators. Microsimulation models are thus very useful to 
take into account interactions between behaviours. For instance, it makes it possible 
to project future completed fertility, which depends on many life course events dealing 
with partnerships and births.  
                                                       
10 Childbirths in a union are modelled by order among children born to the woman only 
11 In fact, only those generations had enough time to reach long union durations.   10
Tables 1: Partnerships and births of children  
detailed results of estimated behaviours 
Transition probabilities concerning partnerships (standard errors into parenthesis) 
  Start of the 1
rst union 
By  duration since the end of schooling 
2
nd  or later-order unions  




  women  men  women  men   











21 or after 
     






































Transition probabilities concerning births, for women living with a coresident partner 
(standard errors into parenthesis) 
 
The 1
rst  woman’s child 
By union duration 
2
nd or later-order 
children 
By age of the youngest 
child already born 
  Women, end of 
schooling 
before 21 
Women, end of 
schooling at 21 
or after 
 


















Number of children the woman already has:  
1     Reference  category 
2     -1.221 
(0.096) 
3     -1.523 
(0.155) 
4 or more     -1.074 
(0.242) 
The youngest one is born:  
Before the beginning of the current 
union  
   0.477 
(0.192) 
After the beginning of the current 
union 
   Reference category 
* duration unit: number of years   
Notes: Logit model estimated in 1995-1996 
For the first birth and the start of the first partnership, the intercept was adjusted to simulate a consistent 
proportion  of women remaining childless. The intercept was increased by 0.1 for the arrival of the first child, 
for women leaving school before 21; 0.07 for women leaving school at 21 or after; 0.18 concerning the 
formation of the first union for women leaving school before 21 and 0.21 for those leaving school at 21 or 
after; 0.2 for men leaving school before 21 and 0.21 for those leaving school at 21 or after. Annual 
probabilities by duration for the first birth are thus increased by 6% on average for the most graduated 
women and 9% for the less ones. The increase is more significant for first unions (20 % for men and the 
most qualified women, and 17 % for the less qualified women).  
Source: Insee 1997  Survey about Young People and Job Histories    11
2.3. Estimating death probabilities by gender, age and relative age at leaving 
school  
a) The data 
The 1975 Insee Mortality Sample is used to estimate social relative advantage on 
death. Information was collected from the 1975 Population Census for about 600 000 
men and 500 000 women born between 1911 and 1945. It was merged with the Insee 
National Registration of People (RNIPP) in order to  register when death occurs. 
 
b) The method 
The aim is to replicate social inequalities towards death and an overall drop in death 
probabilities over time. Social differences are summed up by the age at leaving 
school. Social advantage on death is thus estimated as a function of the relative age 
at leaving school (defined as the difference between the individual’s age at the end of 
schooling and the mean age at leaving school of people belonging to his/her 
generation). The relative advantage is assumed to remain unchanged as the individual 
ages. It is estimated as a polynomial function of the relative age at the end of 
schooling, as follows:  
ε α + + + =
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where α  represents the social  relative advantage in term of death probabilities 
Qsaa f e r ,,  is the death probability for an individual of gender s , age a , and relative age 
at leaving school afer  
a s Q , is the death probability for people of gender s and age a  
 ε  is assumed to be normally distributed (mean=0, standard error=1). 
Table 2: Estimated parameters (standard errors into parenthesis) 
  Women  Men 












Source: 1975 Insee Mortality Sample
12 
 
Thanks to this indicator, death probabilities by gender, age and relative age at leaving 
school can be  inferred from probabilities by gender and age only. The death 
probabilities by gender, age and relative age at leaving school decrease over time, 
reflecting the progress in life expectancy (equations 2 and 3).  
                                                       
12 Data are used to estimate average annual death probabilities by gender, age and relative age at the end 
of schooling and also probabilities by gender and age, between 1990 and 1995. The estimation of  the 
relation between the two death risks relies on women and men aged 45 to 75, to collect enough deaths in 
the sample.    12
Death probabilities by gender and age are assumed to linearly decrease between 
1997 to 2040, as follows: 
for n = 1998 to 2040 ,  
]
1997 2049
)) 2049 ( ln( ) 2049 ( ln(





a s a s
a s a s
Q Q
n Q n Q  (2) 
where:  ) ( , n Q a s is the probability to die within the year n  for people of gender s  and 
age a  
in 1997, the death probabilities are those from Insee vital statistics  
In 2049, the death probabilities are the ones assumed in the Insee global population 
projections 
Finally, death probabilities by gender, age and relative age at leaving school are 
estimated as follows: 
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2.5. Leaving parental home  
Young people still living in parental home are assumed to leave it when starting a 
partnership. For those living with their parents and not experiencing a union within the 
year, a transition to an independent dwelling is simulated. Note that no return is 
possible  for people leaving parental home: departures are irreversible.    
Table 3: Probabilities of leaving parental home for other reasons 
than starting forming a partnership (standard errors into parenthesis) 
  Women  Men 
  End of 
schooling 
before 21 
End of schooling 
at 21 or after 
End of schooling 
before 21 
End of schooling 
at 21 or after 








Duration since the 
end of schooling* 
0.259 
(0.168)    0.222 
(0.118)   
Squared duration 










* duration unit: number of years   
Note: Logit model estimated in 1995-1996 
Source: Insee 1997 Survey about Young People and Job Histories    13
Section 2: Current demographic transition probabilities  
Section 2 describes the current behaviours concerning unions and births, which are 
assumed to remain constant during all the simulation.  
 
Older when leaving school, the most graduated form experienced faster 
their first partnership 
The transition between the end of schooling and the start of the first partnership 
occurs faster for the most graduated people
13  (figure 3) and always quicker for 
women. After the end of schooling, 2.4 years are needed before one woman over two 
leaving  school before the age of 21 has already lived with a coresident partner
14. 
Median duration is only 1.8 years for women leaving school at 21 or after. Diploma 
differences are quite similar for men. For men leaving school before 21, median 
duration is 4.7 years instead of 3.6 years for men leaving school after 21. Age effects 
or differences on the job market may explain the different timings in union formation 
according to the age at leaving school. The most graduated leave school a lot later 
than the less graduated. As a result, once they have achieved their studies, they wish 
to live faster with a partner. In addition, the most graduated are able to get more 
rapidly a secure job, which has a positive effect on their moving in with a partner. The 
fact that behaviours are different between men and women may result from social 
norms. Men have to get a stable job before forming a union. As this constraint is 
weaker for women, they can experience faster a partnership once they have achieved 
school (Galland, 1995).  
Figure 3: Annual risks* for first union by number of years  











0  1  2 3  4  5  6  7  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Number of years since the end of schooling
women, end of schooling 
before 21 
women, end of schooling 
at 21 or after 
men, end of schooling 
before 21  
men, end of schooling 
At 21 or after 
 
*Estimation using logistic regressions on events occurring between 1995 and 1996 
Reading: The probability to form the first union within a year reaches 22% for women leaving school 
before 21, who achieved school 4 years ago and who have not yet lived with a partner. 
Note: According to estimated probabilities, the percentage of people who would live in couple at least 
once over their lifetime is respectively 94% for the less graduated women; 92% for the most 
graduated  ones; 89% for the less graduated men and  91% for the most graduated ones (period 
measures) 
Source: Insee 1997 Survey about Young People and Job Histories  
 
                                                       
13 Note that diploma is not a covariate in the modelling. In the paper, the term diploma refers to the age at 
the end of schooling. The “less graduated” are those leaving school before the age of 21 and the “most 
graduated” are those leaving school at 21 or after. 
14 Only couples sharing the same dwelling are taking into account.   14
Unions become more stable when union duration increases 
Estimated probabilities for a union to break-up within a year decreases with union 
duration (figure 4). Partners who have been living together for a long time are likely to 
have children: disruptions become thus more difficult. The fact that unions become 
more stable when union duration is increasing may also be a consequence of a 
« selection-effect ». Each year partners live together increases the stability of unions, 
since only unions which have the more chances to last have not yet ended.  
If the probabilities by union duration remained the same on the future, 40% of unions 
would be disrupted and one over four would not last more than 10 years. The 
relatively high level of this  period measure may stem from a significant increase in 
union disruptions over the last three decades. 12% of unions started between 1980 
and 1982 lasted less than 3 years, compared to only 4% for those started from 1968 
to 1973 (Léridon 1994).  
Figure 4: Annual risks* of partnership dissolution by union duration 
 
*Estimation using logistic regressions on events occurring between 1995 and 1996 
Reading: The probability for a union to get disrupted within a year is about 3% when the union duration is 3 
years. It is assumed that there is no risk of disruption within the year of formation of  the union (duration 0) 
Note: According to estimated probabilities, 40% of unions would be disrupted (period measure, not including 
ends by partner death).  
Source: Insee 1997 Survey about Young People and Job Histories 
 
After a disruption, starting a second union is more difficult for women 
Starting a second union is more difficult for women. Women are a little less likely to 
live again with a coresident partner. But the main gender difference is that women 
need more time to experience another union. Current probabilities to start a new 
partnership, by number of years spent without a partner, show that 73% of women 
would live with another partner after a disruption, instead of 76% for men. 
Percentages seem to be quite the same for both men and women. But, only few years 
after the disruption, the probability to form another union is much lower for women. 
Only 26% of women live with another partner less than 2 years after a union 
disruption, instead of 41% for men (figure 5).  
This pattern seems to change after 8 years without a partner: annual probability to 
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quite uncertain. In the sample, only few people have been living without a partner for a 
long time after a disruption (only people under 45 were interviewed). Probabilities to 
start a new partnetship by number of years spent alone are based on the behaviour of 
people living without a partner for only a short time (Section 1). Therefore, for long 
durations, estimated transitions are quite uncertain, above all for women
15.  
The fact that, after a union disruption, children stay frequently with their mothers
16 may 
partly explain gender differences (Flipo 2000). Children represent both a financial and 
a social burden that may reduce the opportunity for women to form quickly another 
union. On the one hand, men would prefer younger female partners without children 
(Bozon, 1990). On the other hand, mothers would wait until their children get older 
before forming another union (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1994).  
The probability to start a new partnership after a disruption may seem quite high 
(about 75% for both men and women) in comparison to what is observed nowadays. 
In 1999, only 50% of people whose first union was disrupted about 20-30 years ago 
have formed a new couple (Cassan, Mazuy, Clanché, 2001). But the comparison 
between both percentages is not easy to make, since they deal with unions disrupted 
at very different periods. Differences may result from changes in behaviours over time: 
union disruptions are more frequent for young generations, who start more easily 
other partnerships after a disruption. However, a slightly overestimation when using 
period measures can’t be excluded, as the high estimated level may partly stems from 
uncertainties about behaviours after a long period spent without a partner. 
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*Estimation using Logistic regressions on events occurring between 1995 and 1996 
Reading: The probability to start a new partnership within a year is 11% for a woman whose 
previous union was disrupted 3 years ago.   
Note: According to estimated probabilities, the percentage of people who would finally start 
another partnership after a disruption is 73% for women and 76% for men (period 
measures) 
Source: Inse 1997 Survey about Young People and Job Histories  
 
                                                       
15 We may also slightly over-estimate probabilities to start a second or later-order partnership, as our 
estimations do not take  into account behaviours of people older than 45 (not in the sample), who, for all 
durations, may face more difficulties to start a new partnership after a disruption. The uncertainty on 
union behaviour after long disruptions should not have a strong impact on the final number of children per 
woman since most children are born before the woman reaches 45. 
16 In 1987, in 85% of divorces children were to live with their mothers ; 10% were to live with their fathers 
and 5% with both parents (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1994). In unmarried unions, children live also more 
frequently with their mothers.   16
When living with a partner, it takes more time for the most graduated 
women to give birth to their first child  
Duration between the union formation and the first childbirth is longer for the most 
graduated women (figure 6). Once women form a union, 2.7 years are needed before 
one woman over 2 leaving school after 21 gives birth to her first child. Duration is only 
2.2 for less graduated women. Finally, the most graduated women need less time to 
form a union after leaving school, but they take more time to have children once living 
with a coresident partner. Finally, duration between the end of schooling and the first 
birth is about the same whatever  the woman’s age at the end of schooling
17. There 
was in fact about no change in this duration between 1992 and 1997 for people aged 
26 to 29, despite an increase in the number of years attending school (Galland, 2000).  
Figure 6: Annual risks of the first child birth, for women with a coresident partner 
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*Estimation using Logistic regressions on events occurring between 1995 and 1996 
Reading: the probability to give birth to their first child within a year is 27% for childless woman leaving 
school before 21, who have been living with their partner for 4 years.  
Note: according to the estimated probabilities, the percentage of women who would have at least one child 
over their lifetime is 92% for the less graduated women and 93% for the most graduated women (period 
measures) 
Source: Insee 1997 Survey about Young People and Job Histories  
The probability to have a child decreases with the number of children 
already born, except for women  with numerous children 
The probability to give birth to another child decreases with the number of children 
already born, until the arrival of the fourth, and then increases (figure 7). This result 
may be explained by many reasons, including less desire to have numerous children 
and lower fertility after a certain age. In 1997, age-specific fertility rates increased 
before the age of 28 and decreased thereafter
18  (Beaumel, Eneau, Kerjosse, 1999). 
As mother’s age increases with the number of children, the probability to give birth to 
another baby should decline with the number of children already born. Nevertheless, 
women with numerous children may have particular features that reduce the decline in 
fertility according to the order of the child. The probability to have one more child is 
thus higher for women with 4 children than for those with 2 or 3 children.  
                                                       
17 The probabilities to have a first child, by number of years since the end of schooling, are derived from 
probabilities to experience a first partnership by number of years since the end of schooling and 
probabilities of the  first child birth by union duration.  
18 number of children born in en 1997 by mother’s age divided by the number of women at the same age.   17
The probability to have one more child depends also on the age of the previous one 
(figure 7). When controlling the number of children already born and the position of the 
youngest child in union histories (born before or after the beginning of the current 
union), fertility increases during about four years
19 after the birth of the previous child, 
and then decreases. This may reflect couple’s wish to limit time spell between children 
or an indirect effect of the mother’s age. The probability of giving birth to a baby is 
higher when the previous child is born only a few years ago, because parents want to 
provide a sibling who is about the same age as the previous child. When the previous 
child is more than 4, the drop in the probability to give birth to another baby may also 
stem from the negative effect of the mother’s age, which grows when the previous 
child becomes older.  
The probability to have a baby depends also on women union histories (figure 7). 
When controlling the number of children born to the women,and the age of the 
youngest child, fertility is higher when the youngest child is born before the current 
union. In fact, partners may want a shared biological baby: the first shared child is 
important as (s)he demonstrates parents commitment to each other and as (s)he 
confers a different parental status than step-children (Vikat, Thomson, Hoem, 1999).  
Figure 7: Annual risks of second or later-order births* by number of children women 
already have, the age of the youngest child and his/her position in women union history 
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* only children born to the women are concerned. Estimation using Logistic regressions on events occurring between 1995 and 
1996. 
Reading: for women who had their first child 4 years ago, the probability to have a second child within a year is 27% for those 
who are still living with the first child’s father, and 37% if the first child is born before the current union.  
Source: Insee 1997 Survey about Young People and Job Histories  
 
The relative advantage in life expectancy of graduated people is slighter 
for women than men 
Being more graduated than the others provides continuous gain in life expectancy for 
both men and women (figure 8), but this gain is slighter for women. Controlling for 
age, annual death probabilities decline with the relative age at leaving school. Since 
age at the end of schooling is correlated with social position, this phenomenon may 
partly reflect a social advantage on death. Data show that the probability to die 
                                                       
19 This phenomenom is the same whatever the number of children already born is, as covariates are not 
crossed in the logistic regressions, due to size sample reasons.   18
between 35 and 75 is the lowest for executives and the highest for blue collar workers, 
and social position gains on death are slighter for women (Mesrine, 1999). No wonder 
then that the relative age at leaving school has less influence on female life 
expectancy than on male one.  
Finally, life expectancy is higher for the most graduated people (figure 8). Life 
expectancy continues to rise over time. For women leaving school at the average age 
of their cohort, life expectancy rises from 82.8 years in 2000 to 88.5 in 2030 
(respectively 75.0 to 81.4 years for men). The gap between the most graduated 
people and the less graduated may slowly decline. Between 2000 and 2030, less 
graduated women may gain about 2.5 months per year instead of 2.0 for the most 
graduated (2.7 months per year for the less graduated men instead of 2.2 for the most 
graduated ones). But life expectancy remains significantly higher for the most 
graduated. 
Figure 8: Life expectancy by relative age at leaving school  
 
* difference between the individual’s age at leaving school and the mean one of people from the same 
generation 
Reading: in 2030, a woman leaving school 5 years later than people of her generation is expected to live 
during 90.4 years, if death probabilities in 2030 remain the same during all her life. 
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Section 3:  Which fertility in the future?  
Families  have changed a lot during the last 3 decades. Nowadays, the most frequent 
way to start a partnership is to live with a coresident partner without being married. 
The percentage of couples formed by unmarried partners rose from 10% in the year 
1965 to  90% in the year 1995. Furthermore, unmarried couples tend less frequently to 
get married, even when they have children (Toulemon, 1996). As union disruptions 
become more frequent, they have also changed the context in which families are built. 
According to the divorce rates of mid-1990’s, more than one married couple over 3 
would divorce (Beaumel, Eneau, Kerjosse 1999) and unmarried couples may be less 
stable than married ones (Toulemon, 1994). As union disruptions may occur at 
relatively young ages, women have time to form another union and it is possible for 
them to give birth to a shared biological child with their new partner. While partnership 
patterns have changed, the age at the end of schooling has been increasing. As a 
result, young people tend to delay their moving in with a partner and to postpone the 
first child birth (Galland 1995). Therefore, women have less time to give birth to 
children, but nobody knows yet how their completed fertility will be influenced by those 
postponements.  
Our purpose is to use microsimulation to analyse how female completed fertility may 
evolve if current behaviours by duration are to last, and to understand changes that 
may occur. 
 
No significant change in the age people experience a first union until 
2030 
According to the simulation, the women median age when forming the first union 
remains nearly the same until 2030 (figure 9). It increases a little, from 23 for women 
who will form their first union between the year 2000 and 2005 to less than 23.5 for 
those who will form a couple from 2005 to 2030. This very slight postponement of the 
first union may be driven by the continuous increase in the schooling period for people 
born before 1975. The age at leaving school increases from 19 on average for people 
born between 1960 and 1969 to 21 years old for those born around 1975. However, 
this increase in the time spent at school has only effects at the beginning of the 
simulation, since it is assumed that the age at leaving school remains stable around 
21 years on average for people born after 1975. This assumption is consistent with 
recent observations (schooling expectancy has been quite stable since the end of the 
1990’s).  
The proportion of graduated women among those who start their first unions slightly 
increases as time passes
20. As the most graduated are older when they start living 
with a coresident partner, it may partly explain why the age at the beginning of the first 
union is increasing during the simulation. However, the fact that the duration between 
the end of schooling and the union formation is shorter for the most graduated partly 
offsets this increase. Age at the first union may be slightly overestimated by the 
microsimulation, since it is assumed that nobody forms a couple before the end of 
schooling. It may be the case that students form more frequently a union
21 when the 
age at the end of schooling is increasing.  
 
                                                       
20 51% of women starting their first partnership between 2000 and 2005 leaved school after 21, instead of 
54% for those starting their first partnership between  2020 and 2030. 
21 According to the Insee Survey on Young People and Job Histories, on average during the years 1995 to 
1996, about 9 % of women aged 19 to 45 who are still at school live with a coresident partner.    20
Age at the first motherhood may be increasing over the next decade 
According to the simulation, age at the first birth is significantly increasing from 2000 
to 2010 (figure 9). Women median age at the birth of their first child is 26 for those 
who have their babies about the year 2000. It is rising to around 27 for those who 
have a baby about 2010, and remains quite stable after.   
It is not surprising that the age at the first motherhood is increasing when time spent at 
school is rising, since the most graduated women are older when they give birth to 
their first child. Moreover, as noted above (Section 2), the duration between the end of 
schooling and the first birth is very similar for all women, whatever their diplomas are. 
According to the simulation, the median duration for this transition is about 6 years for 
both women who leave school before 21 and those who leave school after 21.  
Figure 9: Simulated women first union and first birth median ages, 
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Reading: One woman over two experiencing her first union between 2000 and 2004 is less than 
23 when moving in with her partner. One woman over two who gives birth to her first child between 
2000 and  2004 is less than 26 when it occurs.  
Source: Insee, microsimulation model Destinie 
 
Completed fertility: less than 2 children per woman born in 1970? 
Modelling couple formations, disruptions and children births makes it possible to 
simulate how many children women will have over their lifetime. If current behaviours, 
estimated by duration, remain constant, the overall level of fertility may continue to 
decline. Completed fertility has dropped from 2.65 children per woman born between 
1928-1930 to 2.1 for those born in 1947. It remained constant around this level until 
generation 1960 (Daguet, 2001). According to the simulation, it may decrease to less 
than 2 children per woman born in 1970 and then remain constant around 1.9 for 
those born after 1975
22 (figure 10).  
                                                       
22 For a generation, completed fertility is defined as the sum of all age-specific fertility rates registered 
between  the age of 15 and 50. In the simulation, it is estimated as the simulated mean number of 
children per woman aged 45.   21





























Reading: According to the simulation, women born between 1975 and 1979 will have about 0.9 children on average at 30, 
1.4 at 35 and 1.9 at 45. 
Source: Insee,  microsimulation model Destinie 
 
The decrease in female completed fertility has two origins. It is first the consequence 
of an increase in the percentage of women with no child. About 17% of women born 
between 1970 and 1985 may never have children. The level is consistent with other 
studies. This percentage increased from 11% for women born in 1940 to 14 % for 
those born in 1960 (Daguet 2000), and may reach 14% to 18% for women born in 
1970 (Toulemon, 1995). Meanwhile no-child women are becoming more frequent, 
women who give birth to babies have fewer children. The mean number of children 
per mother decreases from 2.4 for women born between 1960 and 1965 to 2.2 for 
those born after 1975. Families with numerous children are less frequent: the 
percentage of mothers with three children or more decreases during the simulation 
from 37% for mothers born between 1960 and 1965 to 32% for those born after 1975. 
The decline in the simulated female completed fertility is due to both negative effects 
of the increase in schooling duration and the rise of union disruptions. Firstly, the first 
child postponement (partly driven by an increase in the time spent at school) delays 
also births of other children
23. The mean number of children per women aged 35 
drops from 1.75 for women born between 1960 and 1964 to less than 1.5 for those 
born after 1975 (figure 13). Since the age limit to fertility is assumed not to change (45 
in the model), the first birth postponement may thus cause a drop in female completed 
fertility. Lifetime fertility declines before remaining quite constant around 1.9 children 
for women born after 1975. 
Secondly, an increase in union disruptions may accentuate the completed fertility 
decline, despite the positive effect of step-families desire to have at least one shared 
biological child. The percentage of women who experience a union disruption among 
                                                       
23 Note that the timing in the arrival of the second or later-order children doesn’t take into account possible 
compensation-effects when women are older at the arrival of the first child. Between birth intervals might 
be shortened in some cases, and lengthened in other cases. Different timings in the arrival of other 
children might thus limit the decline in fertility. Such differences did not prove to be statistically significant, 
maybe because only few women having children later in their life were interviewed.     22
women aged 45 who have already experienced a partnership, rises from 30% for 
women born in 1952-1956  (according to Insee 1997 Survey on Young People and 
Job Histories) to 35% in the simulation for women born between 1975-1984.  
This increase in union disruptions may tend to reduce overall fertility, as women who 
experience disruptions may have fewer children
24. Women born between 1975 and 
1984, who do not live anymore with their first coresident partner, have on average 
about 1.7 children at 45 instead of 2.2 for those who are still living with their first 
partner (table 4). The timing in unions and disruptions seems to play a more important 
role in the fertility level than the only fact that a woman has experienced union 
disruptions. The positive effect of the desire to have a shared biological child may 
offset the infertility of years spent without a partner after a disruption, if it lasts only a 
few years, but it may not be sufficient after a long time spent alone. According to the 
simulation, women who lived alone during less than 8 years until the age 45
25 reach 
nearly the same completed fertility as those who are still living with their first partner 
(2.1 children per women instead of 2.2). Those who spent more years without a 
coresident partner may have fewer children (only 1.3).  
 
Alternative scenarios  
The trend in the decline of the simulated completed fertility relies on the assumption 
that union and birth behaviours will be identical to the ones observed in 1995-1996. 
However, the overall level of fertility was somehow low during this period (Section 1). 
Completed fertility for current young generations may thus be slightly underestimated, 
if the resumption in fertility registered since 1998 were to last.  
Alternative microsimulations help to analyse the sensitivity of simulated outcomes on 
the assumptions regarding union and fertility behaviours. Two changes in assumed 
behaviours have been investigated. Both deal with the effects on fertility of timings in 
union formations and births in step-families, which seem to play a major role in the 
simulated trend in completed fertility. We focus on the simulated completed fertility of 
women who have experienced at least one union before the age of  45, because 
women who have not lived with a coresident partner are not concerned by the 
changes we introduced in aternative scenarios. In the first scenario, the probability to 
have a child in step-families is increased. A probability three times as high as the one 
introduced is needed to rise the completed fertility from 2 to 2.1 for women born in 
1975-1984 who have experienced at least one union (table 4, alternative scenario 1). 
Completed fertility rises from 1.7 to 1.9 children per women for those who are not 
living with their first coresident partner any longer. A slighter increase in the probability 
to have a child in step-families may lead to nearly the same results, if this increase is 
combined with a decrease in the number of years spent without a partner after a 
disruption. When assuming that the probability to have a child in step-families is 
increased by 50% (instead of 200% in the first scenario) and that, in addition, the 
women’s probability to start a new partnership  after a union disruption is identical to 
the men’s one,  completed fertility reaches also 2.1 for women born between 1975 and 
1984, who have experienced at least one union (table 4, alternative scenario 2).  
 
                                                       
24 The fact that disruptions are linked with a slight drop in completed fertility is quite recent. It is observed 
nowadays for women aged 45 to 49 in 1999 (slight differences only) and was not in 1990 (Mazuy and 
Toulemon, 2001). In the simulation, the negative effect of disruptions on lifetime fertility seems more 
significant than the current one.  
25 This duration is the total number of years spent without a coresident partner, from the year at the 
beginning of the first union to the year when the women is 45. For women born between 1975 and 1984, 
median duration is 8.   23
Table 4: Simulated mean number of children per woman aged 45,  
women born between 1975 and 1984 




aged 45  All 
 
Women still with their 
first coresident partner 
Women who do not 
live with their first 
coresident partner any 
longer 
Central simulation 
Simulated completed fertility  1.85 2.0  2.2  1.7 
Alternative scenario 1: probability to have a child in step-families is multiplied by 3 
Simulated completed fertility  1.9 2.1  2.2  1.9 
Alternative scenario 2: probability to have a child in step-families is multiplied by 1.5  
and women second unions formations follow the same patterns as current men ones 
Simulated completed fertility  1.9 2.1  2.2  1.9 
Note:  The probability to have a child in step-families is the probability to have one more child for women whose previous 
children were born before the current union.    
In both scenarios, the increase in the birth probabilities is due to an increase in the estimated intercept (logistic regression). 
The probability to have one more child over her lifetime for a woman with two children born before the current union and 
whose youngest child is 3 rises from less than 60% according to current behaviours (central simulation) to 75% according to 
those in scenario 2 and reaches more than 90% according to those in scenario 1 (period measures).  
Source: Insee, microsimulation model  Destinie 
 
A third scenario investigates the effects of the assumptions on future schooling period. 
Instead of assuming that the mean age at the end of schooling remains constant 
around 21 for people born after 1975, it is assumed that it keeps increasing to reach 
23 for people born after 2020 (figure 11). This change has almost no effect on the 
simulated completed fertility for women born between 1975 and 1984. Effects may 
occur only in longer run. A rise in the time spent at school increases the age at 
motherhood (median age at first birth is 27.7 for women who give birth to their first 
child between 2025 and 2030, instead of 27.0 according to the central simulation), and 
if all behaviours remain as they were in 1995-1996, it might lead to a more significant 
decline in completed fertility beyond 2030.  
Figure 11: Alternative simulated mean age at the end of schooling, by generation 
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Conclusion 
According to our simulation, completed fertility may drop in the future under its current 
level of 2.1 children per women. If, for each duration, current union and fertility 
behaviours observed in 1995 and 1996 remain constant, women born around 1970 
will have on average less than 2.0 children over their lifetime and lifetime fertility will 
stabilize around 1.9 for women born after 1975.  
These simulated results display global trends in future fertility. Nevertheless they 
remain prospective and rely on several assumptions which may not prove adequate in 
the future. In particular, fertility in 1995-1996 was roughly at the mean level registered 
during the 90’s, but was significantly lower than the level reached over the last three 
years. If the increase in fertility registered from 1998 to 2000 proved to be the sign of 
durable change in fertility behaviours, simulated events relying on 1995 and 1996 birth 
behaviours might underestimate young women future completed fertility. Furthermore, 
changes in behaviours may occur. Alternative scenarios show that a significant 
increase in the fertility of step-families as well as changes in the timing of unions may 
influence the results in the long run. Other changes in fertility timing, such as a 
decrease in births time spells along with the first birth postponement or a significant 
increase in old age fertility over the next three decades, have not been investigated 
but might also have significant effects on the number of children women will have over 
their lifetime.    26
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Appendix 1: Period analysis for unions and births 
Appendix 1 describes how period indicators used in Section 2 to summarize unions 
and births behaviours are built.  
 
Annual risks 
The annual risk (
0 t
d q ) to live an event  E  within the year  0 t , when the number of 
years spent after the previous event is d  , is the probability to live this event among 
people who have not already experienced it: 





d S E q =     
where  d is the difference between the year  0 t  and the year when people lived the 
previous event, 
0 t
d E is the number of events lived within year  0 t for people who lived 
the previous event d  years ago and 
0 t
d S is the number of people who lived previous 
event  d years ago and have not already lived the event  E at the first of January   0 t  
(“population at risk to live the event”, or  “survivals”). All durations, numbers of 
survivals and events lived are observed in  0 t . 
Table 5: A review of events and previous events taken into account 
Events of interest 
Years of: 
Previous event 
Year of:  Assumptions 
Start of the first partnership  End of schooling  No unions formed before the 
year of leaving school 
Union disruptions  Start of the union  No disruption during the year 
when a union starts 
Start of another partnership  End of the previous union   
The first child birth  Start of the current union  No child in a union disrupted 
within the year(*) 
2
nd or later-order births  Previous birth  No child in a union disrupted 
within the year(*) 




d q  are estimated using Logistic regressions on events lived in 1995 and 1996. 
Assuming that those annual risks by duration remain constant for all years, the 
inferred probability to have already lived the event E when d  years are elapsed since 
the previous event is then:  
∏
=





u d r q d duration P I
0
) * 1 ( 1 ) (
0  
where  u r is the duration when people are really at risk to live the event  E . This 
duration is always 1 (risk during all the year), except in 2 cases. For risks to have the 
first child during the year when a couple starts, and for risks to start another 
partnership after a disruption during the year when the disruption occurs, people are at 
risk to live the events of interest only between the date of the previous event   30
(respectively, start of the couple and union disruption) and the end of the year, and not 
during all the year. In these cases, it is assumed that the risks occur during half a year 
( 2 1 0 = r  ). 
The two period indicators inferred by period risks used is the paper are:   
1)  the percentage of people who would live the event over their lifetime 
max d I ,  
2) the  median  duration,  2 / 1 d  for which  2 / 1
2 / 1
= d I . Half of the people who can 
live the event (for instance, women in couple, as births are concerned) would 
have already lived it before  2 / 1 d  years have been elapsed since the previous 
event. The other half would live it after or would never lived it. 
The assumption upon which these indicators are made is that people face the 
estimated risks in  0 t  during all their life (unchanged behaviours by duration) and that 
nothing prevents them to be at risk to live it.   31
Appendix 2: A comparison between the microsimulation  
and Global Population Projections 
The main purpose of microsimulation is to analyse changes at the individual level. But 
it provides also future global levels of population, which are very consistent to Insee 
global population projections outcomes.  
 
Microsimulation and global population projections: two approaches to 
project population 
Global population projections are based on cohort-component methods. The 
projection proceeds by updating initial groups of population by sex and age from 1999 
until 2050 according to assumptions on the three components of population change: 
fertility, mortality and migration
26. Central projections are considered as global level 
references for population by sex and age. They assume that Total Fertility Rate will 
remain stable at 1.8 children per woman during all the period, death probabilities will 
continue to decline as it did during the last three decades, and net migrations will 
remain around 50  000, as it has been registered in recent years (Brutel, 2001). 
Change in population by sex and age results from the assumed trends for vital rates.  
In contrast to cohort-component methods, microsimulation simulates life events 
(births, deaths, start and termination of partnerships …) for each individual of an initial 
sample representative of the total population. This technique proceeds by modifying 
each individual situation from 1998 to 2040. It is assumed that probabilities to live 
events (unions, births) by duration remain the same as observed in 1995-1996, death 
probabilities will continue to decline, and net migrations will remain also around 50 000 
(same assumption as for global population projections). Change in population by sex 
and age results from simulated individual behaviours. 
 
Destinie and global population projections: consistent future global level 
of population 
The two different methods, microsimulation and global projections of population, 
provide very close results on the overall change in population by sex and age (figures 
12 to 14). Using data from Destinie may thus lead to global level that are consistent to 
other studies based on projections.  
                                                       
26 for a review of global population projections, including a description of microsimulation methods, see 
O’Neill B.C., Balk D., Brickman M., Ezra M. (2001)   32
Figure  12: Number of births and deaths by year 
Comparison between Destinie and global population macro projections  
(central assumptions)  
 
* average mean order 5 
Source: Insee, microsimulation model Destinie and global population projections 
(central assumptions) 
 
Figure 13: Population growth 
Comparison between Destinie and global population macro projections  
(central assumptions)  
Population by year (on the first of January)  Number of men and women per year (on the first of January) 
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Figure 14 : Age pyramids 1/1/2000 and 1/1/2030 
Comparison between Destinie and global population macro projections  




















































  Macro projections of population  
(central assumptions) 
  Microsimulation model Destinie 
Source: Insee, microsimulation model Destinie and global population  
projections (central assumptions)   34  35
Appendix 3:  
Simulating the number of households with Destinie 
 
Along the microsimulation, links between individuals are created through union 
formations and disruptions, births and leaving parental home. It thus makes it possible 
to analyse the change in households structures, even if Destinie household approach 
is quite different from the common Insee approach of “ordinary” households (defined 
as people living most of the time in the same dwelling).  
 
Households in Destinie 
In Destinie, a household is formed when a young person leaves parental home, or 
when couples break their relationship. Households may disappear when a person dies 
or when unions start. Households structures are thus simplified to represent single 
family units (a couple with or without children, or a single person with or without 
children
27), which are the most common.  
 
Simulated future numbers of households using Destinie 
The simulated median age at leaving parental home is about 25 for men born between 
1975 and 1984
28, and 24 for women (table 6). Outcomes are consistent with studies 
about transition to residential independence. In fact, if the median age at first leaving 
parental home has not changed significantly over the last decade, one over five first 
departures turns out to be temporary and first separate home is often partly paid by 
parents (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 2000). The median age at the first departure from 
parental home was about 22 for men and 21 for women born between 1968 and 1972, 
observed at 29 only, and the median age at first residential independence is about 2 
years later (respectively 24 and 23) (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 2000). However, about 17% 
of men and 10% of women are still living at parental home when 29, so that the 1968-
1972 cohort mean age at the first departure may be quite higher. As a result, our 
simulated median age for permanent move into separate dwelling reflects the age at 
residential independence, but may slightly overestimate the age at the very first 
departure. 
Table 6: Simulated mean age at permanent leaving parental home,  
for people aged 45 born between 1975 and 1984  
 Men  Women 
Median age at leaving parental home  25  24 
% still living at parental home  5%  4% 
Source: Insee, microsimulation model Destinie 
 
As simulated households are likely to be more numerous than ordinary households at 
old ages, the global future number of households (number of household 
representatives) overestimates the number of ordinary households (about 4%). At the 
end of 1999, the simulated number is 24.7 millions instead of 23.8 millions according 
to the last census (March 1999). This global overestimation seems to last when time 
                                                       
27 For instance, two sisters or friends living together, a grandmother living with her daughter, brother in law 
and their children, are not possible patterns. 
28 Cohort median age at leaving parental home is estimated among people aged 45. Older people have 
about no risk to leave parental home if they are still living with their parents, and death probability before 
this age is quite low.   36
passes, but future trends are very similar to Insee global households projections
29 
(figure 15). When distinguishing the evolution by household representative age, 
microsimulation and projections provide about the same number of households at age 
30-59. Results are a little lower for younger households. It may partly stem from 
parental home departure simulation, which represents the transition to residential 
independence in Destinie and not the very first departure. On the contrary, simulated 
figures are a little higher for older households (80 and more), which may stem from not 
taking into account particular household patterns for the elderly, including return to 
children’s home or living in old people home. Since no return to children’s home and 
departure to old people home are simulated, in those cases, all old people are 
considered as living in their own home in our model, whereas, according to Insee 
household definition, they are respectively included in children’s home or considered 
as living out of ordinary households. Notice that the comparison is based on Insee 
projection made in 1994, which will be updated soon using Insee 1999 census. 
Figure 15: Simulated number of households  (end of year) 
Comparison with Insee global projection of households (various rates) 
Global numbers of households 
 
Number of households by household representative age 
   
Source: Insee,  microsimulation model Destinie 
                                                       
29 Comparison between simulation and projections outcomes relies on 1994 projections, in which initial base 
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